CVE-2023-52659
Last modified
CVE-2023-52659 is a medium-severity vulnerability rated 5.5/10 on the CVSS scale. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/mm: Ensure input to pfn_to_kaddr() is treated as a 64-bit type On 64-bit platforms, the pfn_to_kaddr() macro requires that the input value is 64 bits in order to ensure that valid address bits don't get lost when shifting that input by PAGE_SHIFT to calculate the physical address to provide a virtual address for. One such example is in pvalidate_pages() (used by SEV-SNP guests), where the GFN in the struct used for page-state change requests is a 40-bit bit-field, so attempts to pass this GFN field directly into pfn_to_kaddr() ends up causing guest crashes when dealing with addresses above the 1TB range due to the above. Fix this issue with SEV-SNP guests, as well as any similar cases that might cause issues in current/future code, by using an inline function, instead of a macro, so that the input is implicitly cast to the expected 64-bit input type prior to performing the shift operation. While it might be argued that the issue is on the caller side, other archs/macros have taken similar approaches to deal with instances like this, such as ARM explicitly casting the input to phys_addr_t: e48866647b48 ("ARM: 8396/1: use phys_addr_t in pfn_to_kaddr()") A C inline function is even better though. [ mingo: Refined the changelog some more & added __always_inline. ]. EPSS estimates a 0.22% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days.
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/mm: Ensure input to pfn_to_kaddr() is treated as a 64-bit type On 64-bit platforms, the pfn_to_kaddr() macro requires that the input value is 64 bits in order to ensure that valid address bits don't get lost when shifting that input by PAGE_SHIFT to calculate the physical address to provide a virtual address for. One such example is in pvalidate_pages() (used by SEV-SNP guests), where the GFN in the struct used for page-state change requests is a 40-bit bit-field, so attempts to pass this GFN field directly into pfn_to_kaddr() ends up causing guest crashes when dealing with addresses above the 1TB range due to the above. Fix this issue with SEV-SNP guests, as well as any similar cases that might cause issues in current/future code, by using an inline function, instead of a macro, so that the input is implicitly cast to the expected 64-bit input type prior to performing the shift operation. While it might be argued that the issue is on the caller side, other archs/macros have taken similar approaches to deal with instances like this, such as ARM explicitly casting the input to phys_addr_t: e48866647b48 ("ARM: 8396/1: use phys_addr_t in pfn_to_kaddr()") A C inline function is even better though. [ mingo: Refined the changelog some more & added __always_inline. ]
Metrics
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Affected Software
| Vendor | Product | Versions |
|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux Kernel | >= 6.5, < 6.6.23 |
| Linux | Linux Kernel | >= 6.7, < 6.7.11 |
| Linux | Linux Kernel | >= 6.8, < 6.8.2 |
References
Timeline
- Published
- Last Modified
- Status
- Analyzed
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