CVE-2024-43882: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: exec: Fix ToCToU between perm check and set-uid/gid usage When opening a file fo...

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: exec: Fix ToCToU between perm check and set-uid/gid usage When opening a file for exec via do_filp_open(), permission checking is done against the file's metadata at that moment, and on success, a file pointer is passed back. Much later in the execve() code path, the file metadata (specifically mode, uid, and gid) is used to determine if/how to set the uid and gid. However, those values may have changed since the permissions check, meaning the execution may gain unintended privileges. For example, if a file could change permissions from executable and not set-id: ---------x 1 root root 16048 Aug 7 13:16 target to set-id and non-executable: ---S------ 1 root root 16048 Aug 7 13:16 target it is possible to gain root privileges when execution should have been disallowed. While this race condition is rare in real-world scenarios, it has been observed (and proven exploitable) when package managers are updating the setuid bits of installed programs. Such files start with being world-executable but then are adjusted to be group-exec with a set-uid bit. For example, "chmod o-x,u+s target" makes "target" executable only by uid "root" and gid "cdrom", while also becoming setuid-root: -rwxr-xr-x 1 root cdrom 16048 Aug 7 13:16 target becomes: -rwsr-xr-- 1 root cdrom 16048 Aug 7 13:16 target But racing the chmod means users without group "cdrom" membership can get the permission to execute "target" just before the chmod, and when the chmod finishes, the exec reaches brpm_fill_uid(), and performs the setuid to root, violating the expressed authorization of "only cdrom group members can setuid to root". Re-check that we still have execute permissions in case the metadata has changed. It would be better to keep a copy from the perm-check time, but until we can do that refactoring, the least-bad option is to do a full inode_permission() call (under inode lock). It is understood that this is safe against dead-locks, but hardly optimal.

Metrics

CVSS 3.1

7/10

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

EPSS Probability

0.24%

15.2th percentile

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days. Learn more

Weakness Enumeration

Affected Software

Vendor	Product	Versions	Update
Linux	Linux Kernel	< 4.19.320	—
Linux	Linux Kernel	>= 4.20, < 5.4.282	—
Linux	Linux Kernel	>= 5.5, < 5.10.224	—
Linux	Linux Kernel	>= 5.11, < 5.15.165	—
Linux	Linux Kernel	>= 5.16, < 6.1.106	—
Linux	Linux Kernel	>= 6.2, < 6.6.47	—
Linux	Linux Kernel	>= 6.7, < 6.10.6	—
Linux	Linux Kernel	6.11	Rc1

References

Timeline

Published: Aug 21, 2024
Last Modified: Jun 17, 2026
Status: Modified

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2024-43882?

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: exec: Fix ToCToU between perm check and set-uid/gid usage When opening a file for exec via do_filp_open(), permission checking is done against the file's metadata at that moment, and on success, a file pointer is passed back. Much later in the execve() code path, the file metadata (specifically mode, uid, and gid) is used to determine if/how to set the uid and gid. However, those values may have changed since the permissions check, meaning the execution may gain unintended privileges. For example, if a file could change permissions from executable and not set-id: ---------x 1 root root 16048 Aug 7 13:16 target to set-id and non-executable: ---S------ 1 root root 16048 Aug 7 13:16 target it is possible to gain root privileges when execution should have been disallowed. While this race condition is rare in real-world scenarios, it has been observed (and proven exploitable) when package managers are updating the setuid bits of installed programs. Such files start with being world-executable but then are adjusted to be group-exec with a set-uid bit. For example, "chmod o-x,u+s target" makes "target" executable only by uid "root" and gid "cdrom", while also becoming setuid-root: -rwxr-xr-x 1 root cdrom 16048 Aug 7 13:16 target becomes: -rwsr-xr-- 1 root cdrom 16048 Aug 7 13:16 target But racing the chmod means users without group "cdrom" membership can get the permission to execute "target" just before the chmod, and when the chmod finishes, the exec reaches brpm_fill_uid(), and performs the setuid to root, violating the expressed authorization of "only cdrom group members can setuid to root". Re-check that we still have execute permissions in case the metadata has changed. It would be better to keep a copy from the perm-check time, but until we can do that refactoring, the least-bad option is to do a full inode_permission() call (under inode lock). It is understood that this is safe against dead-locks, but hardly optimal.

How severe is CVE-2024-43882?

CVE-2024-43882 has a CVSS score of 7/10 (HIGH severity). The EPSS model estimates a 0.24% probability of exploitation in the next 30 days.

How do I fix CVE-2024-43882?

Check the vendor references and advisories linked above for patched versions and mitigation guidance. You can also run a Strix scan to test if your systems are affected.