CVE-2025-38413: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: virtio-net: xsk: rx: fix the frame's length check When calling buf_to_xdp, the l...

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: virtio-net: xsk: rx: fix the frame's length check When calling buf_to_xdp, the len argument is the frame data's length without virtio header's length (vi->hdr_len). We check that len with xsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size() + vi->hdr_len to ensure the provided len does not larger than the allocated chunk size. The additional vi->hdr_len is because in virtnet_add_recvbuf_xsk, we use part of XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM for virtio header and ask the vhost to start placing data from hard_start + XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM - vi->hdr_len not hard_start + XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM But the first buffer has virtio_header, so the maximum frame's length in the first buffer can only be xsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size() not xsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size() + vi->hdr_len like in the current check. This commit adds an additional argument to buf_to_xdp differentiate between the first buffer and other ones to correctly calculate the maximum frame's length.

Metrics

CVSS 3.1

5.5/10

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

EPSS Probability

0.15%

4.9th percentile

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days. Learn more

Affected Software

Vendor	Product	Versions	Update
Linux	Linux Kernel	>= 6.11, < 6.12.37	—
Linux	Linux Kernel	>= 6.13, < 6.15.6	—
Linux	Linux Kernel	6.16	Rc1

References

Timeline

Published: Jul 25, 2025
Last Modified: Jun 17, 2026
Status: Analyzed

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2025-38413?

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: virtio-net: xsk: rx: fix the frame's length check When calling buf_to_xdp, the len argument is the frame data's length without virtio header's length (vi->hdr_len). We check that len with xsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size() + vi->hdr_len to ensure the provided len does not larger than the allocated chunk size. The additional vi->hdr_len is because in virtnet_add_recvbuf_xsk, we use part of XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM for virtio header and ask the vhost to start placing data from hard_start + XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM - vi->hdr_len not hard_start + XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM But the first buffer has virtio_header, so the maximum frame's length in the first buffer can only be xsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size() not xsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size() + vi->hdr_len like in the current check. This commit adds an additional argument to buf_to_xdp differentiate between the first buffer and other ones to correctly calculate the maximum frame's length.

How severe is CVE-2025-38413?

CVE-2025-38413 has a CVSS score of 5.5/10 (MEDIUM severity). The EPSS model estimates a 0.15% probability of exploitation in the next 30 days.

How do I fix CVE-2025-38413?

Check the vendor references and advisories linked above for patched versions and mitigation guidance. You can also run a Strix scan to test if your systems are affected.