CVE-2025-47277

vLLM, an inference and serving engine for large language models (LLMs), has an issue in versions 0.6.5 through 0.8.4 that ONLY impacts environments using the `PyNcclPipe` KV cache transfer integration with the V0 engine. No other configurations are affected. vLLM supports the use of the `PyNcclPipe` class to establish a peer-to-peer communication domain for data transmission between distributed nodes. The GPU-side KV-Cache transmission is implemented through the `PyNcclCommunicator` class, while CPU-side control message passing is handled via the `send_obj` and `recv_obj` methods on the CPU side.​ The intention was that this interface should only be exposed to a private network using the IP address specified by the `--kv-ip` CLI parameter. The vLLM documentation covers how this must be limited to a secured network. The default and intentional behavior from PyTorch is that the `TCPStore` interface listens on ALL interfaces, regardless of what IP address is provided. The IP address given was only used as a client-side address to use. vLLM was fixed to use a workaround to force the `TCPStore` instance to bind its socket to a specified private interface. As of version 0.8.5, vLLM limits the `TCPStore` socket to the private interface as configured.

• CWE-502

• https://docs.vllm.ai/en/latest/deployment/security.htmlTechnical Description
• https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/0d6e187e88874c39cda7409cf673f9e6546893e7Patch
• https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/15988Issue Tracking, Patch
• https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-hjq4-87xh-g4fvExploit, Vendor Advisory

Published

May 20, 2025

Last Modified

Jun 17, 2026

Status

Analyzed