CVE-2026-12051: The USB DFU class implementation in Zephyr's new (experimental) device_next USB device stack contains a NULL pointer dereference in handle_download() ...

Description

The USB DFU class implementation in Zephyr's new (experimental) device_next USB device stack contains a NULL pointer dereference in handle_download() (subsys/usb/device_next/class/usbd_dfu.c). The handler computes MIN(setup->wLength, buf->len) and passes buf->data to the image write callback without checking that the buf net_buf pointer is non-NULL. The handler is reached over the USB control endpoint, driven by the USB host. For a DFU_DNLOAD (download) request with no Data OUT stage — notably the zero-length terminating download that the DFU protocol uses to end a firmware transfer — the USB core invokes the class handler with a NULL buffer. After the device has been advanced to the DFU_DNLOAD_IDLE state (by sending one valid download block and a GET_STATUS), a zero-length DFU_DNLOAD reaches handle_download() with buf == NULL, dereferencing it. The result is a NULL+offset read that triggers a fatal CPU fault, i.e. a denial of service (device crash/reset). The attacker is whatever controls the USB host the device is attached to; DFU download support must be enabled with a registered image. There is no memory corruption or information disclosure — impact is limited to availability. The fix adds an explicit if (buf != NULL) guard so the callback receives a zero-length, NULL-data transfer instead of crashing.

Metrics

CVSS 3.1

4.6/10

CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

EPSS Probability

0.17%

6.3th percentile

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days. Learn more

Weakness Enumeration

CWE-476

Affected Software

Source: CNA advisory (CVE.org). NVD analysis pending.

Vendor	Product	Versions
zephyrproject	zephyr	>= 4.4.0, < 4.5.0

References

Timeline

Published: Aug 11, 2026
Last Modified: Aug 11, 2026
Status: Received

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-12051?

The USB DFU class implementation in Zephyr's new (experimental) device_next USB device stack contains a NULL pointer dereference in handle_download() (subsys/usb/device_next/class/usbd_dfu.c). The handler computes MIN(setup->wLength, buf->len) and passes buf->data to the image write callback without checking that the buf net_buf pointer is non-NULL. The handler is reached over the USB control endpoint, driven by the USB host. For a DFU_DNLOAD (download) request with no Data OUT stage — notably the zero-length terminating download that the DFU protocol uses to end a firmware transfer — the USB core invokes the class handler with a NULL buffer. After the device has been advanced to the DFU_DNLOAD_IDLE state (by sending one valid download block and a GET_STATUS), a zero-length DFU_DNLOAD reaches handle_download() with buf == NULL, dereferencing it. The result is a NULL+offset read that triggers a fatal CPU fault, i.e. a denial of service (device crash/reset). The attacker is whatever controls the USB host the device is attached to; DFU download support must be enabled with a registered image. There is no memory corruption or information disclosure — impact is limited to availability. The fix adds an explicit if (buf != NULL) guard so the callback receives a zero-length, NULL-data transfer instead of crashing.

How severe is CVE-2026-12051?

CVE-2026-12051 has a CVSS score of 4.6/10 (MEDIUM severity). The EPSS model estimates a 0.17% probability of exploitation in the next 30 days.

How do I fix CVE-2026-12051?

Check the vendor references and advisories linked above for patched versions and mitigation guidance. You can also run a Strix scan to test if your systems are affected.

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