CVE-2026-31614: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas() The bounds check uses ...

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas() The bounds check uses (u8 *)ea + nlen + 1 + vlen as the end of the EA name and value, but ea_data sits at offset sizeof(struct smb2_file_full_ea_info) = 8 from ea, not at offset 0. The strncmp() later reads ea->ea_data[0..nlen-1] and the value bytes follow at ea_data[nlen+1..nlen+vlen], so the actual end is ea->ea_data + nlen + 1 + vlen. Isn't pointer math fun? The earlier check (u8 *)ea > end - sizeof(*ea) only guarantees the 8-byte header is in bounds, but since the last EA is placed within 8 bytes of the end of the response, the name and value bytes are read past the end of iov. Fix this mess all up by using ea->ea_data as the base for the bounds check. An "untrusted" server can use this to leak up to 8 bytes of kernel heap into the EA name comparison and influence which WSL xattr the data is interpreted as.

Metrics

CVSS 3.1

7.1/10

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H

EPSS Probability

0.13%

2.6th percentile

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days. Learn more

Weakness Enumeration

CWE-125

Affected Software

Vendor	Product	Versions
Linux	Linux Kernel	>= 6.6.32, < 6.6.136
Linux	Linux Kernel	>= 6.9, < 6.12.83
Linux	Linux Kernel	>= 6.13, < 6.18.24
Linux	Linux Kernel	>= 6.19, < 6.19.14
Linux	Linux Kernel	>= 7.0, < 7.0.1

References

Timeline

Published: Apr 24, 2026
Last Modified: Jun 17, 2026
Status: Analyzed

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-31614?

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas() The bounds check uses (u8 *)ea + nlen + 1 + vlen as the end of the EA name and value, but ea_data sits at offset sizeof(struct smb2_file_full_ea_info) = 8 from ea, not at offset 0. The strncmp() later reads ea->ea_data[0..nlen-1] and the value bytes follow at ea_data[nlen+1..nlen+vlen], so the actual end is ea->ea_data + nlen + 1 + vlen. Isn't pointer math fun? The earlier check (u8 *)ea > end - sizeof(*ea) only guarantees the 8-byte header is in bounds, but since the last EA is placed within 8 bytes of the end of the response, the name and value bytes are read past the end of iov. Fix this mess all up by using ea->ea_data as the base for the bounds check. An "untrusted" server can use this to leak up to 8 bytes of kernel heap into the EA name comparison and influence which WSL xattr the data is interpreted as.

How severe is CVE-2026-31614?

CVE-2026-31614 has a CVSS score of 7.1/10 (HIGH severity). The EPSS model estimates a 0.13% probability of exploitation in the next 30 days.

How do I fix CVE-2026-31614?

Check the vendor references and advisories linked above for patched versions and mitigation guidance. You can also run a Strix scan to test if your systems are affected.