CVE-2026-44894: Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. NoQuicTokenHandler is the tokenHandler used when the applica...

Description

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. NoQuicTokenHandler is the tokenHandler used when the application does not set one. Prior to version 4.2.15.Final, its writeToken() returns false (server will not send Retry — acceptable), but validateToken() unconditionally `return 0`. In QuicheQuicServerCodec.handlePacket(), a non-negative return from validateToken() is interpreted as 'token is valid, ODCID starts at offset 0', causing the server to call quiche_accept as if the client's address had been validated by a Retry round-trip. Per RFC 9000 §8.1, a validated address lifts the 3× anti-amplification send limit. Thus any attacker who includes ANY non-empty token bytes in an Initial packet — with a spoofed victim source IP — causes the Netty server to treat the victim as validated and reflect full-size handshake flights (certificates, etc.) toward it without the 3× cap. The correct 'no token handler' semantics would be to return -1 (invalid) so the normal un-validated path and amplification limit apply. Version 4.2.15.Final patches the issue.

Metrics

CVSS 3.1

7.5/10

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

EPSS Probability

0.14%

4.0th percentile

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days. Learn more

Weakness Enumeration

Affected Software

Vendor	Product	Versions
Netty	Netty	>= 4.2.0, < 4.2.15

References

Timeline

Published: Jun 12, 2026
Last Modified: Jul 15, 2026
Status: Modified

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-44894?

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. NoQuicTokenHandler is the tokenHandler used when the application does not set one. Prior to version 4.2.15.Final, its writeToken() returns false (server will not send Retry — acceptable), but validateToken() unconditionally `return 0`. In QuicheQuicServerCodec.handlePacket(), a non-negative return from validateToken() is interpreted as 'token is valid, ODCID starts at offset 0', causing the server to call quiche_accept as if the client's address had been validated by a Retry round-trip. Per RFC 9000 §8.1, a validated address lifts the 3× anti-amplification send limit. Thus any attacker who includes ANY non-empty token bytes in an Initial packet — with a spoofed victim source IP — causes the Netty server to treat the victim as validated and reflect full-size handshake flights (certificates, etc.) toward it without the 3× cap. The correct 'no token handler' semantics would be to return -1 (invalid) so the normal un-validated path and amplification limit apply. Version 4.2.15.Final patches the issue.

How severe is CVE-2026-44894?

CVE-2026-44894 has a CVSS score of 7.5/10 (HIGH severity). The EPSS model estimates a 0.14% probability of exploitation in the next 30 days.

How do I fix CVE-2026-44894?

Check the vendor references and advisories linked above for patched versions and mitigation guidance. You can also run a Strix scan to test if your systems are affected.

How Strix Helps

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