CVE-2026-53224

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: validate embedded INIT chunk and address list lengths in cookie sctp_unpack_cookie() only checked that the embedded INIT chunk length did not exceed the remaining cookie payload, but did not ensure that the INIT chunk is large enough to contain a complete INIT header. A malformed COOKIE_ECHO can therefore carry a truncated INIT chunk whose length field is smaller than sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk). Later, sctp_process_init() accesses INIT parameters unconditionally, which may lead to out-of-bounds reads. In addition, raw_addr_list_len is not fully validated against the remaining cookie payload. When cookie authentication is disabled, an attacker can supply an oversized raw_addr_list_len and cause sctp_raw_to_bind_addrs() to read beyond the end of the cookie. The address parser also lacks sufficient bounds checks for parameter headers and lengths, allowing malformed address parameters to trigger out-of-bounds reads. Fix this by: - requiring the embedded INIT chunk length to be at least sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk); - validating that the INIT chunk and raw address list together fit within the cookie payload; - verifying sufficient data exists for each address parameter header and payload before parsing it. Note that sctp_verify_init() must be called after sctp_unpack_cookie() and before sctp_process_init() when cookie authentication is disabled. This will be addressed in a separate patch.

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/512a9bb77c04ac9927648ea58af617e472be96e6
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6f4c80a2a7e6d06753b89a578b710a2499a5e62b
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7560afb8cddafd829e709d7ea09230e45a825557

Published

Jun 25, 2026

Last Modified

Jun 25, 2026

Status

Received