CVE-2026-53357
Last modified
CVE-2026-53357 is a high-severity vulnerability rated 8/10 on the CVSS scale. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: fix UAF in l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() vs l2cap_conn_del() bt_accept_dequeue() unlinks a not-yet-accepted child from the parent accept queue and release_sock()s it before returning, so the returned sk has no caller reference and is unlocked. l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() walks these children on listening-socket close. A concurrent HCI disconnect drives hci_rx_work -> l2cap_conn_del() which runs l2cap_chan_del() + l2cap_sock_kill() and frees the child sk and its l2cap_chan; cleanup_listen() then uses both: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in l2cap_sock_kill l2cap_sock_kill / l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen / __x64_sys_close Freed by: l2cap_conn_del -> l2cap_sock_close_cb -> l2cap_sock_kill This is distinct from the two fixes already in this area: commit e83f5e24da741 ("Bluetooth: serialize accept_q access") serialises the accept_q list/poll and takes temporary refs inside bt_accept_dequeue(), and CVE-2025-39860 serialises the userspace close()/accept() race by calling cleanup_listen() under lock_sock() in l2cap_sock_release(). Neither covers l2cap_conn_del() running from hci_rx_work, so this UAF still reproduces on current bluetooth/master. Take the reference at the source: bt_accept_dequeue() does sock_hold() while sk is still locked, before release_sock(); callers sock_put(). cleanup_listen() pins the chan with l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero() under a brief child sk lock (serialising vs l2cap_sock_teardown_cb()), drops it before l2cap_chan_lock(), and skips a duplicate l2cap_sock_kill() on SOCK_DEAD. EPSS estimates a 0.25% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days.
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: fix UAF in l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() vs l2cap_conn_del() bt_accept_dequeue() unlinks a not-yet-accepted child from the parent accept queue and release_sock()s it before returning, so the returned sk has no caller reference and is unlocked. l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() walks these children on listening-socket close. A concurrent HCI disconnect drives hci_rx_work -> l2cap_conn_del() which runs l2cap_chan_del() + l2cap_sock_kill() and frees the child sk and its l2cap_chan; cleanup_listen() then uses both: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in l2cap_sock_kill l2cap_sock_kill / l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen / __x64_sys_close Freed by: l2cap_conn_del -> l2cap_sock_close_cb -> l2cap_sock_kill This is distinct from the two fixes already in this area: commit e83f5e24da741 ("Bluetooth: serialize accept_q access") serialises the accept_q list/poll and takes temporary refs inside bt_accept_dequeue(), and CVE-2025-39860 serialises the userspace close()/accept() race by calling cleanup_listen() under lock_sock() in l2cap_sock_release(). Neither covers l2cap_conn_del() running from hci_rx_work, so this UAF still reproduces on current bluetooth/master. Take the reference at the source: bt_accept_dequeue() does sock_hold() while sk is still locked, before release_sock(); callers sock_put(). cleanup_listen() pins the chan with l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero() under a brief child sk lock (serialising vs l2cap_sock_teardown_cb()), drops it before l2cap_chan_lock(), and skips a duplicate l2cap_sock_kill() on SOCK_DEAD. conn->lock is not taken here: cleanup_listen() runs under the parent sk lock and that would invert conn->lock -> chan->lock -> sk_lock (lockdep). KASAN/SMP: an unprivileged listen/close vs HCI-disconnect race produced 12 use-after-free reports per run before this change; 0, and no lockdep report, over 1600+ raced iterations after it on bluetooth/master.
Metrics
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weakness Enumeration
Affected Software
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Update |
|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux Kernel | >= 5.7, < 5.10.259 | — |
| Linux | Linux Kernel | >= 5.11, < 5.15.210 | — |
| Linux | Linux Kernel | >= 5.16, < 6.1.175 | — |
| Linux | Linux Kernel | >= 6.2, < 6.6.142 | — |
| Linux | Linux Kernel | >= 6.7, < 6.12.92 | — |
| Linux | Linux Kernel | >= 6.13, < 6.18.34 | — |
| Linux | Linux Kernel | >= 6.19, < 7.0.11 | — |
| Linux | Linux Kernel | 7.1 | Rc1 |
References
Timeline
- Published
- Last Modified
- Status
- Analyzed
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