Strix
26.1K

CVE-2026-63920

HIGHCVSS 7.1/10EPSS 0.16%

Last modified

CVE-2026-63920 is a high-severity vulnerability rated 7.1/10 on the CVSS scale. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: validate extension header length before copying to cmsg ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl() builds IPV6_{HOPOPTS,DSTOPTS,RTHDR} cmsgs (and their IPV6_2292* legacy counterparts) by trusting the on-wire hdrlen byte (ptr[1]) when computing the put_cmsg() length. The length was validated only at parse time (ipv6_parse_hopopts(), etc.). An nftables payload-write expression can rewrite hdrlen after parsing and before the skb reaches recvmsg; the write itself is in-bounds but put_cmsg() then reads up to ((hdrlen+1) << 3) = 2040 bytes from an 8-byte header. EPSS estimates a 0.16% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days.

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: validate extension header length before copying to cmsg ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl() builds IPV6_{HOPOPTS,DSTOPTS,RTHDR} cmsgs (and their IPV6_2292* legacy counterparts) by trusting the on-wire hdrlen byte (ptr[1]) when computing the put_cmsg() length. The length was validated only at parse time (ipv6_parse_hopopts(), etc.). An nftables payload-write expression can rewrite hdrlen after parsing and before the skb reaches recvmsg; the write itself is in-bounds but put_cmsg() then reads up to ((hdrlen+1) << 3) = 2040 bytes from an 8-byte header. nftables is reachable from an unprivileged user namespace, so this is an unprivileged slab-out-of-bounds read: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in put_cmsg+0x3ac/0x540 put_cmsg+0x3ac/0x540 udpv6_recvmsg+0xca0/0x1250 sock_recvmsg+0xdf/0x190 ____sys_recvmsg+0x1b1/0x620 Add ipv6_get_exthdr_len() which validates that at least two bytes are accessible before reading the hdrlen field, then checks the computed length against skb_tail_pointer(skb), returning 0 on failure. Extension headers are kept in the linear skb area by pskb_may_pull() during input, so skb_tail_pointer() is the correct bound. Use ipv6_get_exthdr_len() at all non-AH call sites: the five standalone cmsg blocks (HbH, 2292HbH, 2292DSTOPTS x2, 2292RTHDR) and the three standard cases in the extension-header walk loop (DSTOPTS, ROUTING, default). AH retains an inline bounds check because its length formula differs ((ptr[1]+2)<<2). The walk loop also gets a pre-read bounds check at the top to validate ptr before any case accesses ptr[0] or ptr[1]. When the walk loop detects a corrupted header, return from the function instead of continuing to process later socket options.

Metrics

CVSS 3.1
7.1/10

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H

EPSS Probability
0.16%

5.5th percentile

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days. Learn more

Affected Software

Source: CNA advisory (CVE.org). NVD analysis pending.

VendorProductVersions
LinuxLinux>= 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2, < 81394827dfb72772c50d0ae3bdfa094428a5d76d; >= 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2, < 931b4a1f13408c2507719890f78f7227c34a0282; >= 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2, < 08464413e628803bd10cb1df68d0138665f2f885; >= 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2, < a29768d56eb3798c052ad3281b05596e695a17af; >= 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2, < 0d330eff318c0f44d4fb0ad2c2aef38f87f24c90; >= 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2, < a35daeabb433686234b010ebf7b53778dbd6c9b8; >= 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2, < eb18a1b1644e4cad978df2131e2bb9a2e6886992; >= 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2, < dd433671fef381fdaf7b530c631e6b782d66e224
LinuxLinux2.6.12

References

Timeline

Published
Last Modified
Status
Awaiting Analysis

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-63920?
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: validate extension header length before copying to cmsg ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl() builds IPV6_{HOPOPTS,DSTOPTS,RTHDR} cmsgs (and their IPV6_2292* legacy counterparts) by trusting the on-wire hdrlen byte (ptr[1]) when computing the put_cmsg() length. The length was validated only at parse time (ipv6_parse_hopopts(), etc.). An nftables payload-write expression can rewrite hdrlen after parsing and before the skb reaches recvmsg; the write itself is in-bounds but put_cmsg() then reads up to ((hdrlen+1) << 3) = 2040 bytes from an 8-byte header. nftables is reachable from an unprivileged user namespace, so this is an unprivileged slab-out-of-bounds read: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in put_cmsg+0x3ac/0x540 put_cmsg+0x3ac/0x540 udpv6_recvmsg+0xca0/0x1250 sock_recvmsg+0xdf/0x190 ____sys_recvmsg+0x1b1/0x620 Add ipv6_get_exthdr_len() which validates that at least two bytes are accessible before reading the hdrlen field, then checks the computed length against skb_tail_pointer(skb), returning 0 on failure. Extension headers are kept in the linear skb area by pskb_may_pull() during input, so skb_tail_pointer() is the correct bound. Use ipv6_get_exthdr_len() at all non-AH call sites: the five standalone cmsg blocks (HbH, 2292HbH, 2292DSTOPTS x2, 2292RTHDR) and the three standard cases in the extension-header walk loop (DSTOPTS, ROUTING, default). AH retains an inline bounds check because its length formula differs ((ptr[1]+2)<<2). The walk loop also gets a pre-read bounds check at the top to validate ptr before any case accesses ptr[0] or ptr[1]. When the walk loop detects a corrupted header, return from the function instead of continuing to process later socket options.
How severe is CVE-2026-63920?
CVE-2026-63920 has a CVSS score of 7.1/10 (HIGH severity). The EPSS model estimates a 0.16% probability of exploitation in the next 30 days.
How do I fix CVE-2026-63920?
Check the vendor references and advisories linked above for patched versions and mitigation guidance. You can also run a Strix scan to test if your systems are affected.

How Strix Helps

Related CVEs from 2026

View all 2026CVEs →

Are you affected by CVE-2026-63920?

Run a free Strix scan to check your systems for this vulnerability.

Scan your code now

Source: NVD / NIST