CVE-2026-64560

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: posix-cpu-timers: Prevent UAF caused by non-leader exec() race Wongi and Jungwoo decoded and reported a non-leader exec() related race which can result in an UAF: sys_timer_delete() exec() posix_cpu_timer_del() // Observes old leader p = pid_task(pid, pid_type); de_thread() switch_leader(); release_task(old_leader) __exit_signal(old_leader) sighand = lock(old_leader, sighand); posix_cpu_timers*_exit(); sighand = lock_task_sighand(p) unhash_task(old_leader); sh = lock(p, sighand) old_leader->sighand = NULL; unlock(sighand); (p->sighand == NULL) unlock(sh) return NULL; // Returns without action if(!sighand) return 0; free_posix_timer(); This is "harmless" unless the deleted timer was armed and enqueued in p->signal because on exec() a TGID targeted timer is inherited. As sys_timer_delete() freed the underlying posix timer object run_posix_cpu_timers() or any timerqueue related add/delete operations on other timers will access the freed object's timerqueue node, which results in an UAF. There is a similar problem vs. posix_cpu_timer_set(). For regular posix timers it just transiently returns -ESRCH to user space, but for the use case in do_cpu_nanosleep() it's the same UAF just that the k_itimer is allocated on the stack. Also posix_cpu_timer_rearm() fails to rearm the timer, which means it stops to expire. While debating solutions Frederic pointed out another problem: posix_cpu_timer_del(tmr) __exit_signal(p) posix_cpu_timers*_exit(p); unhash_task(p); p->sighand = NULL; sh = lock_task_sighand(p) sighand = p->sighand; if (!sighand) return NULL; lock(sighand); if (!sh) WARN_ON_ONCE(timer_queued(tmr)); On weakly ordered architectures it is not guaranteed that posix_cpu_timer_del() will observe the stores in posix_cpu_timers*_exit() when p->sighand is observed as NULL, which means the WARN() can be a false positive. Solve these issues by: 1) Changing the store in __exit_signal() to smp_store_release(). 2) Adding a smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep() into the !sighand path of lock_task_sighand(). 3) Creating a helper function for looking up the task and locking sighand which does not return when sighand == NULL. Instead it retries the task lookup and only if that fails it gives up. 4) Using that helper in the three affected functions. #1/#2 ensures that the reader side which observes sighand == NULL also observes all preceeding stores, i.e. the stores in posix_cpu_timers*_exit() and the ones in unhash_task(). #3 ensures that the above described non-leader exec() situation is handled gracefully. When the task lookup returns the old leader, but sighand == NULL then it retries. In the non-leader exec() case the subsequent task lookup will observe the new leader due to #1/#2. In normal exit() scenarios the subsequent lookup fails. When the task lookup fails, the function also checks whether the timer is still enqueued and issues a warning if that's the case. Unfortunately there is nothing which can be done about it, but as the task is already not longer visible the timer should not be accessed anymore. This check also requires memory ordering, which is not provided when the first lookup fails. To achieve that the check is preceeded by a smp_rmb() which pairs with the smp_wmb() in write_seqlock() in __exit_signal(). That ensures that the stores in posix_cpu_timers*_exit() are visible. The history of the non-leader exec() issue goes back to the early days of posix CPU timers, which stored a pointer to the group leader task in the timer. That obviously fails when a non-leader exec() switches the leader. commit e0a70217107e ("posix-cpu-timers: workaround to suppress the problems with mt exec") added a temporary workaround for that in 2010 which surv ---truncated---

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/12a891c773aeb5823d63dbd0cb2ab931d6c21c9b
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/67aa823e3e8c229c6d374df79c804f6721cb83b6
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6a7ecc25abe6f0fecc6e62a05096987200edbd02
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/920f893f735e92ba3a1cd9256899a186b161928d
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ad1cafa1bdaa71da85d71cac053838bbe97852b6
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cc35ddbc497311e0b6b9a6a6a4f4d1217d6ab1aa
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d8bcb28abad857f1415da7656f19b2ada90af04f
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e74443f5db0037c556ef436fa64b88bf4ea08f83

Published

Jul 29, 2026

Last Modified

Jul 30, 2026

Status

Received

• How Strix found a critical auth bypass in etcdStrix autonomously discovered a critical authentication bypass in etcd, later designated CVE-2026-33413.
• Autonomous PentestingAI agents that find and validate exploitable vulnerabilities like this one across your applications.
• PR ReviewsPentest every pull request so vulnerable code is caught before it ships to production.
• AI Penetration TestingHow AI-driven penetration testing continuously covers your attack surface.

• CVE-2026-64555In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been re…8.8
• CVE-2026-64556In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been re…7.8
• CVE-2026-64557In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been re…8.8
• CVE-2026-64558In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been re…7.8
• CVE-2026-64559In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been re…7.8
• CVE-2026-6456The Account Switcher plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to P…8.8
• CVE-2026-64561In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been re…8.8
• CVE-2026-64562In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been re…8.8
• CVE-2026-64563In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been re…7.8
• CVE-2026-64564In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been re…9.8
• CVE-2026-64565In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been re…
• CVE-2026-64566In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been re…9.8