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CVE-2026-80772

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Last modified

CVE-2026-80772 is a vulnerability of currently unknown severity. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: nintendo: fix out-of-bounds read in joycon_ctlr_read_handler() joycon_ctlr_read_handler() casts an incoming HID input report to struct joycon_input_report and parses it, guarding the cast only with a 12-byte length check: if (size >= 12) /* make sure it contains the input report */ joycon_parse_report(ctlr, (struct joycon_input_report *)data); struct joycon_input_report is 49 bytes: a 13-byte header followed by a union whose IMU arm is 36 bytes. For an IMU report joycon_parse_report() -> joycon_parse_imu_report() walks that union (struct offsets 13..48), so a report of exactly 12 bytes with data[0] == JC_INPUT_IMU_DATA passes the guard yet is read up to 37 bytes past its declared length.

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: nintendo: fix out-of-bounds read in joycon_ctlr_read_handler() joycon_ctlr_read_handler() casts an incoming HID input report to struct joycon_input_report and parses it, guarding the cast only with a 12-byte length check: if (size >= 12) /* make sure it contains the input report */ joycon_parse_report(ctlr, (struct joycon_input_report *)data); struct joycon_input_report is 49 bytes: a 13-byte header followed by a union whose IMU arm is 36 bytes. For an IMU report joycon_parse_report() -> joycon_parse_imu_report() walks that union (struct offsets 13..48), so a report of exactly 12 bytes with data[0] == JC_INPUT_IMU_DATA passes the guard yet is read up to 37 bytes past its declared length. The over-read bytes are decoded into accelerometer/gyroscope values and forwarded to userspace through the "(IMU)" input device, leaking driver-internal memory. data[0] and size are fully controlled by a malicious or spoofed Joy-Con/Pro Controller. Receive buffers are sized to the maximum report length, so this is an over-read within the allocation rather than a slab OOB, but the decoded bytes still reach userspace. The sibling subcmd path in joycon_ctlr_handle_event() already bounds the same cast correctly: if (size < sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) || data[0] != JC_INPUT_SUBCMD_REPLY) break; Use the same sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) bound here.

Affected Software

Source: CNA advisory (CVE.org). NVD analysis pending.

VendorProductVersions
LinuxLinux>= 2af16c1f846bd60240745bbd3afa13d5f040c61a, < 33ea29f8b6141f2d265de807e110a6435b355cb0; >= 2af16c1f846bd60240745bbd3afa13d5f040c61a, < bd397c4123a4bc084913d8c7fdb40ef94e9f8172; >= 2af16c1f846bd60240745bbd3afa13d5f040c61a, < addca61f9a23c0d20a387c2040e70479f54518e1; >= 2af16c1f846bd60240745bbd3afa13d5f040c61a, < 51cfd1adbe7a46bb08af162abb3ab3b6820e2d15; >= 2af16c1f846bd60240745bbd3afa13d5f040c61a, < d4cabd4089adb59cf7974915737c52cc47a9bb1b; >= 2af16c1f846bd60240745bbd3afa13d5f040c61a, < 34725ed4719da424113db8449fb5485aaf71a913; >= 2af16c1f846bd60240745bbd3afa13d5f040c61a, < 27b376b945c0aac46fcdfcc950b14a85b874b557
LinuxLinux5.16

References

Timeline

Published
Last Modified
Status
Received

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-80772?
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: nintendo: fix out-of-bounds read in joycon_ctlr_read_handler() joycon_ctlr_read_handler() casts an incoming HID input report to struct joycon_input_report and parses it, guarding the cast only with a 12-byte length check: if (size >= 12) /* make sure it contains the input report */ joycon_parse_report(ctlr, (struct joycon_input_report *)data); struct joycon_input_report is 49 bytes: a 13-byte header followed by a union whose IMU arm is 36 bytes. For an IMU report joycon_parse_report() -> joycon_parse_imu_report() walks that union (struct offsets 13..48), so a report of exactly 12 bytes with data[0] == JC_INPUT_IMU_DATA passes the guard yet is read up to 37 bytes past its declared length. The over-read bytes are decoded into accelerometer/gyroscope values and forwarded to userspace through the "(IMU)" input device, leaking driver-internal memory. data[0] and size are fully controlled by a malicious or spoofed Joy-Con/Pro Controller. Receive buffers are sized to the maximum report length, so this is an over-read within the allocation rather than a slab OOB, but the decoded bytes still reach userspace. The sibling subcmd path in joycon_ctlr_handle_event() already bounds the same cast correctly: if (size < sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) || data[0] != JC_INPUT_SUBCMD_REPLY) break; Use the same sizeof(struct joycon_input_report) bound here.
How severe is CVE-2026-80772?
Severity scoring for CVE-2026-80772 is pending analysis.
How do I fix CVE-2026-80772?
Check the vendor references and advisories linked above for patched versions and mitigation guidance. You can also run a Strix scan to test if your systems are affected.

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Source: NVD / NIST