CVE-2026-89624

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: universal-pidff: stop the device when force-feedback init fails universal_pidff_probe() starts the device with hid_hw_start() and then, if force-feedback initialisation fails, returns the error through a label that only does "return error". The device is left started. The HID core does not unwind on the driver's behalf. __hid_device_probe() releases the devres group, closes the report and clears hdev->driver: if (ret) { devres_release_group(&hdev->dev, hdev->devres_group_id); hid_close_report(hdev); hdev->driver = NULL; } The hidraw character device that hid_hw_start() registered through hid_connect() is allocated with kzalloc() and added with cdev_device_add(), so it is not devres-managed and survives that. With hdev->driver NULL, hid_device_remove() skips hid_hw_stop() as well, because it only unwinds while a driver is still attached. The registration therefore outlives the device on both paths. Opening the surviving /dev/hidrawX writes into freed memory. KASAN reports a use-after-free write from hidraw_open() -> hid_hw_open() -> the transport's open callback, which takes a spinlock inside the freed object. A descriptor that carries a PID usage page and no input reports is enough: hidraw claims the device so hid_hw_start() succeeds, while hid->inputs stays empty so force-feedback init fails. The other failure returns in hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() - no output reports, an allocation failure, pidff_init_fields(), pidff_check_autocenter(), an unusable effect count, input_ff_create() - all reach the same label. Stop the device on that path. hid-dr.c and hid-emsff.c, which start the device with the same HID_CONNECT_DEFAULT & ~HID_CONNECT_FF mask, already do this. The two earlier gotos must keep returning without hid_hw_stop(), since neither has a started device, so give the path that fails after the start its own label. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/01d9874e84d3ab78fd212ad822412eb3af84497f
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/519fa26695b02870022fcdc651efb3d379abe54e
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c457bb516b61edeab940235a011928e26925381e
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ce08c5555cabcd444d8b77fa69a7cb68bb05f611

Published

Sep 11, 2026

Last Modified

Sep 21, 2026

Status

Received

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