CVE-2026-89894: Linux Vulnerability (CVSS 7.8)

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: cx231xx: reject geometry changes while the VBI queue is busy vidioc_s_fmt_vid_cap() and vidioc_s_std() change the device-wide dev->width / dev->norm but only refuse the change when the *video* queue (dev->vidq) is busy. The VBI queue (dev->vbiq) shares that same geometry: cx231xx_init_vbi_isoc() latches dma_q->lines_per_field from dev->norm, the VBI videobuf2 plane is sized from dev->width / dev->norm in vbi_queue_setup() and vbi_buf_prepare(), and cx231xx_do_vbi_copy() then recomputes the destination offset from the *live* dev->width and the latched lines_per_field on every URB completion: offset = lines_completed * (dev->width << 1) + ...; if (dma_q->current_field == 2) offset += dev->width * 2 * dma_q->lines_per_field; memcpy(plane + offset, p_buffer, lencopy); Because the VBI node shares video_ioctl_ops with the video node, an application can size a small VBI plane (REQBUFS/QBUF with a small width, or with the NTSC standard), then enlarge dev->width (or switch dev->norm to PAL) through the video node while the VBI stream is running -- the change is allowed because only dev->vidq is checked -- and let the device deliver a field-2 VBI payload. cx231xx_do_vbi_copy() now computes the offset with the larger geometry and memcpy()s past the end of the smaller plane that was already allocated, a heap out-of-bounds write whose offset is attacker-chosen and whose contents come from the device. The per-field guard in cx231xx_copy_vbi_line() does not help: it bounds the copy against the latched lines_per_field, not the plane's real capacity, and vb2 does not re-run buf_prepare() for an already prepared buffer. Refuse the format/standard change when the VBI queue is busy as well, so the geometry cannot change underneath an allocated VBI buffer.

Metrics

CVSS 3.1

7.8/10

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Affected Software

Source: CNA advisory (CVE.org). NVD analysis pending.

Vendor	Product	Versions
Linux	Linux	>= 7c617138b8254a6bb60bfb5b8fc53eb8b3d6c3ab, < aa3314506deb9703bcf0e889db08959440228fbf; >= 7c617138b8254a6bb60bfb5b8fc53eb8b3d6c3ab, < 90d50648af36a1fbf5dbc99238de6fd0e58a13e0; >= 7c617138b8254a6bb60bfb5b8fc53eb8b3d6c3ab, < a5dd3d7fba358ff9486f3f51b2a9038348c0970a; >= 7c617138b8254a6bb60bfb5b8fc53eb8b3d6c3ab, < 54ac6df8b8d97eddc3ae97fd2045bdedc8541b6d; >= 7c617138b8254a6bb60bfb5b8fc53eb8b3d6c3ab, < 1d1079db8d1807e259a1d2679ed314949797aad9; >= 7c617138b8254a6bb60bfb5b8fc53eb8b3d6c3ab, < 7087bef6510c7df5df0b19192633b8ecc0f33a6f; >= 7c617138b8254a6bb60bfb5b8fc53eb8b3d6c3ab, < a636c72c7f522d984fa498fc0631f33a2d0be3fd; >= 7c617138b8254a6bb60bfb5b8fc53eb8b3d6c3ab, < 627a121c15fe05a541f44d86016294b80bada75d
Linux	Linux	5.5

References

Timeline

Published: Sep 16, 2026
Last Modified: Sep 16, 2026
Status: Received

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-89894?

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: cx231xx: reject geometry changes while the VBI queue is busy vidioc_s_fmt_vid_cap() and vidioc_s_std() change the device-wide dev->width / dev->norm but only refuse the change when the *video* queue (dev->vidq) is busy. The VBI queue (dev->vbiq) shares that same geometry: cx231xx_init_vbi_isoc() latches dma_q->lines_per_field from dev->norm, the VBI videobuf2 plane is sized from dev->width / dev->norm in vbi_queue_setup() and vbi_buf_prepare(), and cx231xx_do_vbi_copy() then recomputes the destination offset from the *live* dev->width and the latched lines_per_field on every URB completion: offset = lines_completed * (dev->width << 1) + ...; if (dma_q->current_field == 2) offset += dev->width * 2 * dma_q->lines_per_field; memcpy(plane + offset, p_buffer, lencopy); Because the VBI node shares video_ioctl_ops with the video node, an application can size a small VBI plane (REQBUFS/QBUF with a small width, or with the NTSC standard), then enlarge dev->width (or switch dev->norm to PAL) through the video node while the VBI stream is running -- the change is allowed because only dev->vidq is checked -- and let the device deliver a field-2 VBI payload. cx231xx_do_vbi_copy() now computes the offset with the larger geometry and memcpy()s past the end of the smaller plane that was already allocated, a heap out-of-bounds write whose offset is attacker-chosen and whose contents come from the device. The per-field guard in cx231xx_copy_vbi_line() does not help: it bounds the copy against the latched lines_per_field, not the plane's real capacity, and vb2 does not re-run buf_prepare() for an already prepared buffer. Refuse the format/standard change when the VBI queue is busy as well, so the geometry cannot change underneath an allocated VBI buffer.

How severe is CVE-2026-89894?

CVE-2026-89894 has a CVSS score of 7.8/10 (HIGH severity).

How do I fix CVE-2026-89894?

Check the vendor references and advisories linked above for patched versions and mitigation guidance. You can also run a Strix scan to test if your systems are affected.

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