CVE-2026-96455

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes an HTTP API for managing the robot. Its app installation endpoint, POST /apps/install in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/routers/apps.py, has no authentication. The handler's only dependency is Depends(get_app_manager), which just hands back the manager object from application state, so nothing in the chain ever checks a credential. The endpoint takes an AppInfo body naming a Hugging Face Space. The daemon downloads that Space and installs it as a Python package through install_package in src/reachy_mini/apps/sources/local_common_venv.py, using uv or pip. Installing a Python package runs the package's own build and setup code, so whoever chooses the Space chooses what code the robot runs. Anyone can publish a public Hugging Face Space, so this is not a meaningful restriction on the attacker. How far this reaches depends on the model. In _resolve_bind_host in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/main.py the daemon binds 0.0.0.0 when it runs as the wireless version and 127.0.0.1 otherwise, with the vendor's own comment explaining that the robot has to be reachable on the LAN. On a wireless unit, then, any host on the same network can install and run code on the robot without credentials. One related change has already shipped but does not fix this. Version 1.8.2 replaced the wildcard CORS policy with an allow list of localhost and Tauri origins. That closes the browser drive-by route, where a web page the victim visits silently calls the endpoint in the background. It has no effect on this issue: CORS is enforced by browsers and governs whether script may read a response, while a direct HTTP request from another machine on the network involves no browser, no preflight and no CORS check at all.

• CWE-306
• CWE-494

• https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini
• https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/blob/main/src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/main.py
• https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/blob/main/src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/routers/apps.py
• https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/pull/1207
• https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/releases/tag/v1.11.0

Published

Sep 23, 2026

Last Modified

Sep 23, 2026

Status

Received

• How Strix found a critical auth bypass in etcdStrix autonomously discovered a critical authentication bypass in etcd, later designated CVE-2026-33413.
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