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CVE-2026-98406

Unknown

Last modified

CVE-2026-98406 is a vulnerability of currently unknown severity. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: avoid WARN in set_bitrate_mask when sdata not in driver ieee80211_set_bitrate_mask() checks if the interface is running via ieee80211_sdata_running(), but it does not check if the interface is still present in the driver. When sdata is running but IEEE80211_SDATA_IN_DRIVER is not set, the call reaches drv_set_bitrate_mask() in driver-ops.h which hits wlan1: Failed check-sdata-in-driver check, flags: 0x0 WARNING: net/mac80211/driver-ops.h:884 at drv_set_bitrate_mask Syzkaller triggers this via wext SIOCSIWRATE ioctl. The Call Trace shows wext_ioctl_dispatch() in wext-core.c dispatching the ioctl, calling ioctl_standard_call() for SIOCSIWRATE, which calls cfg80211_wext_siwrate() in wext-compat.c.

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: avoid WARN in set_bitrate_mask when sdata not in driver ieee80211_set_bitrate_mask() checks if the interface is running via ieee80211_sdata_running(), but it does not check if the interface is still present in the driver. When sdata is running but IEEE80211_SDATA_IN_DRIVER is not set, the call reaches drv_set_bitrate_mask() in driver-ops.h which hits wlan1: Failed check-sdata-in-driver check, flags: 0x0 WARNING: net/mac80211/driver-ops.h:884 at drv_set_bitrate_mask Syzkaller triggers this via wext SIOCSIWRATE ioctl. The Call Trace shows wext_ioctl_dispatch() in wext-core.c dispatching the ioctl, calling ioctl_standard_call() for SIOCSIWRATE, which calls cfg80211_wext_siwrate() in wext-compat.c. That builds a bitrate mask and calls rdev_set_bitrate_mask() which ends up in ieee80211_set_bitrate_mask() in cfg.c. The interface is marked running via SDATA_STATE_RUNNING but flags is 0, so check_sdata_in_driver() fails. When the interface is being torn down, or when wext ioctl is issued during interface bringup before drv_add_interface() sets IN_DRIVER, the running check passes while IN_DRIVER is clear. Check IEEE80211_SDATA_IN_DRIVER in ieee80211_set_bitrate_mask() before calling the driver, returning -ENETDOWN. This avoids the WARN_ONCE in driver-ops.h and matches other cfg.c operations that bail early when not in driver. This change should be safe because wiphy mutex is held in cfg80211_wext_siwrate() via guard(wiphy), and IN_DRIVER is set/cleared under RTNL and wiphy paths in drv_add_interface() and drv_remove_interface() in driver-ops.c, so the check is race-free against driver add/remove. Returning -ENETDOWN is the same error other not-running paths use and does not introduce new locking. [also add second syzbot report]

Affected Software

Source: CNA advisory (CVE.org). NVD analysis pending.

VendorProductVersions
LinuxLinux>= 554a43d5e77e8256aa9685ffd19ad555e6f77979, < 4ba86c44b2fcb1c3175caa2456b6d58f483446ab; >= 554a43d5e77e8256aa9685ffd19ad555e6f77979, < 4095b66acae9893dd13deb39a4331651cb2f822b; >= 554a43d5e77e8256aa9685ffd19ad555e6f77979, < c2cd9c44777cf97be3e35c10b7c2d8f59ebb9306; >= 554a43d5e77e8256aa9685ffd19ad555e6f77979, < 0d1700394e9f5d0bd9bebad8d5a50edf983f52fd; >= 554a43d5e77e8256aa9685ffd19ad555e6f77979, < 7978dda63d2b109ea9c3f7a096cd1aac6542cd54; >= 554a43d5e77e8256aa9685ffd19ad555e6f77979, < 432c8532d5ccc2af77da43ed6ef1c80495a4efe8; >= 554a43d5e77e8256aa9685ffd19ad555e6f77979, < c4ee5685af444024e6222ce29f6ed36adc44ffc3; >= 554a43d5e77e8256aa9685ffd19ad555e6f77979, < da2ca406f45a6e21760243152ed8d2e8e72915c2
LinuxLinux3.5

References

Timeline

Published
Last Modified
Status
Received

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-98406?
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: avoid WARN in set_bitrate_mask when sdata not in driver ieee80211_set_bitrate_mask() checks if the interface is running via ieee80211_sdata_running(), but it does not check if the interface is still present in the driver. When sdata is running but IEEE80211_SDATA_IN_DRIVER is not set, the call reaches drv_set_bitrate_mask() in driver-ops.h which hits wlan1: Failed check-sdata-in-driver check, flags: 0x0 WARNING: net/mac80211/driver-ops.h:884 at drv_set_bitrate_mask Syzkaller triggers this via wext SIOCSIWRATE ioctl. The Call Trace shows wext_ioctl_dispatch() in wext-core.c dispatching the ioctl, calling ioctl_standard_call() for SIOCSIWRATE, which calls cfg80211_wext_siwrate() in wext-compat.c. That builds a bitrate mask and calls rdev_set_bitrate_mask() which ends up in ieee80211_set_bitrate_mask() in cfg.c. The interface is marked running via SDATA_STATE_RUNNING but flags is 0, so check_sdata_in_driver() fails. When the interface is being torn down, or when wext ioctl is issued during interface bringup before drv_add_interface() sets IN_DRIVER, the running check passes while IN_DRIVER is clear. Check IEEE80211_SDATA_IN_DRIVER in ieee80211_set_bitrate_mask() before calling the driver, returning -ENETDOWN. This avoids the WARN_ONCE in driver-ops.h and matches other cfg.c operations that bail early when not in driver. This change should be safe because wiphy mutex is held in cfg80211_wext_siwrate() via guard(wiphy), and IN_DRIVER is set/cleared under RTNL and wiphy paths in drv_add_interface() and drv_remove_interface() in driver-ops.c, so the check is race-free against driver add/remove. Returning -ENETDOWN is the same error other not-running paths use and does not introduce new locking. [also add second syzbot report]
How severe is CVE-2026-98406?
Severity scoring for CVE-2026-98406 is pending analysis.
How do I fix CVE-2026-98406?
Check the vendor references and advisories linked above for patched versions and mitigation guidance. You can also run a Strix scan to test if your systems are affected.

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Source: NVD / NIST