CVE-2026-64523

CRITICALCVSS 9.8/10EPSS 0.35%

Last modified

CVE-2026-64523 is a critical-severity vulnerability rated 9.8/10 on the CVSS scale. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/handshake: Take a long-lived file reference at submit handshake_nl_accept_doit() needs the file pointer backing req->hr_sk->sk_socket to survive the window between handshake_req_next() and the subsequent FD_PREPARE() and get_file(). The submit-side sock_hold() does not provide that. sk_refcnt keeps struct sock alive, but struct socket is owned by sock->file: when the consumer fputs the last file reference, sock_release() tears the socket down regardless of any sock_hold. Add an hr_file pointer to struct handshake_req and acquire an explicit reference on sock->file during handshake_req_submit(). handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() release the reference on the completion-bit-winning path. The submit error path must also release the file reference, but after rhashtable insertion a concurrent handshake_req_cancel() can discover the request and race the error path. EPSS estimates a 0.35% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days.

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/handshake: Take a long-lived file reference at submit handshake_nl_accept_doit() needs the file pointer backing req->hr_sk->sk_socket to survive the window between handshake_req_next() and the subsequent FD_PREPARE() and get_file(). The submit-side sock_hold() does not provide that. sk_refcnt keeps struct sock alive, but struct socket is owned by sock->file: when the consumer fputs the last file reference, sock_release() tears the socket down regardless of any sock_hold. Add an hr_file pointer to struct handshake_req and acquire an explicit reference on sock->file during handshake_req_submit(). handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() release the reference on the completion-bit-winning path. The submit error path must also release the file reference, but after rhashtable insertion a concurrent handshake_req_cancel() can discover the request and race the error path. Gate the error-path cleanup -- sk_destruct restoration, fput, and request destruction -- with test_and_set_bit(HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED), the same serialization handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() already use. When cancel has already claimed ownership, the submit error path returns without touching the request; socket teardown handles final destruction. The accept-side dereferences are not yet retargeted; that change comes in the next patch.

Metrics

CVSS 3.1
9.8/10

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

EPSS Probability
0.35%

27.4th percentile

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days. Learn more

Affected Software

Source: CNA advisory (CVE.org). NVD analysis pending.

VendorProductVersions
LinuxLinux>= 3b3009ea8abb713b022d94fba95ec270cf6e7eae, < 685b10dd0e32c7782cead16c8cf055c609678583; >= 3b3009ea8abb713b022d94fba95ec270cf6e7eae, < b913801ad9b9a51437d84d030ec6843e08976bd6; >= 3b3009ea8abb713b022d94fba95ec270cf6e7eae, < 16eaba5aa89c04eea125905bb8f988c1897f4f29; >= 3b3009ea8abb713b022d94fba95ec270cf6e7eae, < 09dba37eee70d0596e26645015f1aa95a9848e9d
LinuxLinux6.4

References

Timeline

Published
Last Modified
Status
Received

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-64523?
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/handshake: Take a long-lived file reference at submit handshake_nl_accept_doit() needs the file pointer backing req->hr_sk->sk_socket to survive the window between handshake_req_next() and the subsequent FD_PREPARE() and get_file(). The submit-side sock_hold() does not provide that. sk_refcnt keeps struct sock alive, but struct socket is owned by sock->file: when the consumer fputs the last file reference, sock_release() tears the socket down regardless of any sock_hold. Add an hr_file pointer to struct handshake_req and acquire an explicit reference on sock->file during handshake_req_submit(). handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() release the reference on the completion-bit-winning path. The submit error path must also release the file reference, but after rhashtable insertion a concurrent handshake_req_cancel() can discover the request and race the error path. Gate the error-path cleanup -- sk_destruct restoration, fput, and request destruction -- with test_and_set_bit(HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED), the same serialization handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() already use. When cancel has already claimed ownership, the submit error path returns without touching the request; socket teardown handles final destruction. The accept-side dereferences are not yet retargeted; that change comes in the next patch.
How severe is CVE-2026-64523?
CVE-2026-64523 has a CVSS score of 9.8/10 (CRITICAL severity). The EPSS model estimates a 0.35% probability of exploitation in the next 30 days.
How do I fix CVE-2026-64523?
Check the vendor references and advisories linked above for patched versions and mitigation guidance. You can also run a Strix scan to test if your systems are affected.

How Strix Helps

Related CVEs from 2026

Are you affected by CVE-2026-64523?

Run a free Strix scan to check your systems for this vulnerability.

Scan your code now

Source: NVD / NIST