CVE-2026-64527: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/hyperv: validate VMBus packet size in receive callback hyperv_receive_sub() ...

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/hyperv: validate VMBus packet size in receive callback hyperv_receive_sub() reads msg->vid_hdr.type and dispatches into one of four message-type branches without knowing how many bytes the host wrote into hv->recv_buf. The completion path then runs memcpy(hv->init_buf, msg, VMBUS_MAX_PACKET_SIZE), so the consumer that wakes on wait_for_completion_timeout() can read up to 16 KiB of residue from a prior message as if it were the response payload. Pass bytes_recvd into hyperv_receive_sub() and reject any packet that does not cover the pipe + synthvid header. A single switch on msg->vid_hdr.type then computes the type-specific payload size: the three completion-driving types (SYNTHVID_VERSION_RESPONSE, SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE, SYNTHVID_VRAM_LOCATION_ACK) fall through to a shared exit that requires that size before memcpy/complete, while SYNTHVID_FEATURE_CHANGE validates its own payload and returns before reading is_dirt_needed. Unknown types are dropped. SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE is variable length: the host fills resolution_count entries, not the full SYNTHVID_MAX_RESOLUTION_COUNT array. Validate the fixed prefix first so resolution_count can be read, bound it against the array, then require only the count-sized array, so the shorter responses the host actually sends are accepted. Only run the sub-handler when vmbus_recvpacket() returned success. The memcpy length is bytes_recvd, which is bounded by VMBUS_MAX_PACKET_SIZE only on a successful receive; on -ENOBUFS vmbus_recvpacket() instead reports the required length, which can exceed hv->recv_buf, so copying bytes_recvd would read and write past the 16 KiB buffers. Gating on the success return keeps the copy bounded. The nonzero-return path is itself a malformed-message case and is now logged rather than silently skipped; channel recovery is not attempted. Rejected packets are reported via drm_err_ratelimited() rather than silently dropped, matching the CoCo-hardened pattern in hv_kvp_onchannelcallback().

Affected Software

Source: CNA advisory (CVE.org). NVD analysis pending.

Vendor	Product	Versions
Linux	Linux	>= 76c56a5affeba1e163b66b9d8cc192e6154466f0, < 57d5d697642e05d5dd2d40660817765943dd709f; >= 76c56a5affeba1e163b66b9d8cc192e6154466f0, < f5251226551bfec98c4705641b6f94ff1f238d91; >= 76c56a5affeba1e163b66b9d8cc192e6154466f0, < 049a6b474823049fe60212f25f26e4b30f44ee8f; >= 76c56a5affeba1e163b66b9d8cc192e6154466f0, < 588c84b461393ff1998ac7b97b04f953f642e0df; >= 76c56a5affeba1e163b66b9d8cc192e6154466f0, < 164dc7bf17609340233c6bf4f66bb7c7008a0511; >= 76c56a5affeba1e163b66b9d8cc192e6154466f0, < c8974d96b6a5496f33dc69a3ce28a7bf5078def4; >= 76c56a5affeba1e163b66b9d8cc192e6154466f0, < 7f87763f47a3c22fb50265a00619ef10f2394b18
Linux	Linux	5.14

References

Timeline

Published: Jul 25, 2026
Last Modified: Jul 25, 2026
Status: Received

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-64527?

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/hyperv: validate VMBus packet size in receive callback hyperv_receive_sub() reads msg->vid_hdr.type and dispatches into one of four message-type branches without knowing how many bytes the host wrote into hv->recv_buf. The completion path then runs memcpy(hv->init_buf, msg, VMBUS_MAX_PACKET_SIZE), so the consumer that wakes on wait_for_completion_timeout() can read up to 16 KiB of residue from a prior message as if it were the response payload. Pass bytes_recvd into hyperv_receive_sub() and reject any packet that does not cover the pipe + synthvid header. A single switch on msg->vid_hdr.type then computes the type-specific payload size: the three completion-driving types (SYNTHVID_VERSION_RESPONSE, SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE, SYNTHVID_VRAM_LOCATION_ACK) fall through to a shared exit that requires that size before memcpy/complete, while SYNTHVID_FEATURE_CHANGE validates its own payload and returns before reading is_dirt_needed. Unknown types are dropped. SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE is variable length: the host fills resolution_count entries, not the full SYNTHVID_MAX_RESOLUTION_COUNT array. Validate the fixed prefix first so resolution_count can be read, bound it against the array, then require only the count-sized array, so the shorter responses the host actually sends are accepted. Only run the sub-handler when vmbus_recvpacket() returned success. The memcpy length is bytes_recvd, which is bounded by VMBUS_MAX_PACKET_SIZE only on a successful receive; on -ENOBUFS vmbus_recvpacket() instead reports the required length, which can exceed hv->recv_buf, so copying bytes_recvd would read and write past the 16 KiB buffers. Gating on the success return keeps the copy bounded. The nonzero-return path is itself a malformed-message case and is now logged rather than silently skipped; channel recovery is not attempted. Rejected packets are reported via drm_err_ratelimited() rather than silently dropped, matching the CoCo-hardened pattern in hv_kvp_onchannelcallback().

How severe is CVE-2026-64527?

Severity scoring for CVE-2026-64527 is pending analysis.

How do I fix CVE-2026-64527?

Check the vendor references and advisories linked above for patched versions and mitigation guidance. You can also run a Strix scan to test if your systems are affected.

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