CVE-2026-80780: Linux Vulnerability

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: pidff: fix OOB write when hid->inputs is empty hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() derives its input_dev from list_entry(hid->inputs.next, struct hid_input, list) without first checking that hid->inputs is non-empty. The list member of struct hid_input is at offset 0, so on an empty list list_entry() yields &hid->inputs itself and the following hidinput->input load reads an unrelated member of struct hid_device. dev is then a type-confused pointer, and force-feedback init writes through it: each set_bit(FF_*, dev->ffbit) stores 8 bytes at dev + 192, past the end of the object dev actually aliases, and input_ff_create() adds further writes of a heap pointer and two function pointers. Until hid-universal-pidff the only caller was hid_pidff_init() from usbhid, which runs under HID_CLAIMED_INPUT and therefore always has at least one hid_input. universal_pidff_probe() starts the device with HID_CONNECT_DEFAULT & ~HID_CONNECT_FF and then calls hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() directly whenever the descriptor carries a PID usage page, bypassing that gate. A report descriptor whose only application collection is on HID_UP_PID leaves hid->inputs empty while hid_connect() still succeeds through the hidraw claim, so probe reaches the unguarded list_entry(). The write happens in the USB probe path, on the hotplug workqueue, so plugging in a malicious device is enough to trigger it; no attacker software and no logged-in user are required. KASAN reports an 8-byte out-of-bounds write in hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() reached from universal_pidff_probe(). Check for an empty list before deriving dev and return -ENODEV, as the other HID force-feedback drivers already do. universal_pidff_probe() propagates the error and unwinds. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>

Affected Software

Source: CNA advisory (CVE.org). NVD analysis pending.

Vendor	Product	Versions
Linux	Linux	>= c1fde337b317f0a226de92803288741c30799eb0, < 2e0471bf3ab2a6b7eedcc3b8a2a17286b6a9ae1a; >= f45f26a6b3e7260c129c7c6bb0ace63aeb7b3868, < ad9330f7e74a97842815a291a0d7389ed2f34504; >= f06bf8d94fffbb544b1cb5402c92e0a075f0d420, < 4529c03c3da8f91392cd630453452f569973f4cd; >= f06bf8d94fffbb544b1cb5402c92e0a075f0d420, < d416eeb7d016d82af67c149d884bc6a9323c4ac7; >= f06bf8d94fffbb544b1cb5402c92e0a075f0d420, < 86b63adfa5e132beac4be72668fdf9128fe51d2e; >= f06bf8d94fffbb544b1cb5402c92e0a075f0d420, < 67bb1074e3d2d12fa059a9cc707e89398a4e4704; af9f2471dfe5a48384f5b7f021a673fbc741465e; b797352954eee6dc084cfaed0659dea60adfb484; >= 6.6.88, < 6.6.156; >= 6.12.24, < 6.12.108; >= 6.13.12, < 6.14; >= 6.14.3, < 6.15
Linux	Linux	6.15

References

Timeline

Published: Sep 4, 2026
Last Modified: Sep 4, 2026
Status: Received

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-80780?

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: pidff: fix OOB write when hid->inputs is empty hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() derives its input_dev from list_entry(hid->inputs.next, struct hid_input, list) without first checking that hid->inputs is non-empty. The list member of struct hid_input is at offset 0, so on an empty list list_entry() yields &hid->inputs itself and the following hidinput->input load reads an unrelated member of struct hid_device. dev is then a type-confused pointer, and force-feedback init writes through it: each set_bit(FF_*, dev->ffbit) stores 8 bytes at dev + 192, past the end of the object dev actually aliases, and input_ff_create() adds further writes of a heap pointer and two function pointers. Until hid-universal-pidff the only caller was hid_pidff_init() from usbhid, which runs under HID_CLAIMED_INPUT and therefore always has at least one hid_input. universal_pidff_probe() starts the device with HID_CONNECT_DEFAULT & ~HID_CONNECT_FF and then calls hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() directly whenever the descriptor carries a PID usage page, bypassing that gate. A report descriptor whose only application collection is on HID_UP_PID leaves hid->inputs empty while hid_connect() still succeeds through the hidraw claim, so probe reaches the unguarded list_entry(). The write happens in the USB probe path, on the hotplug workqueue, so plugging in a malicious device is enough to trigger it; no attacker software and no logged-in user are required. KASAN reports an 8-byte out-of-bounds write in hid_pidff_init_with_quirks() reached from universal_pidff_probe(). Check for an empty list before deriving dev and return -ENODEV, as the other HID force-feedback drivers already do. universal_pidff_probe() propagates the error and unwinds. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com>

How severe is CVE-2026-80780?

Severity scoring for CVE-2026-80780 is pending analysis.

How do I fix CVE-2026-80780?

Check the vendor references and advisories linked above for patched versions and mitigation guidance. You can also run a Strix scan to test if your systems are affected.

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