CVE-2026-18418

The zbus proxy agent IPC backend in subsys/zbus/proxy_agent/zbus_proxy_agent_ipc.c logged the channel name of a rejected inter-domain frame with a plain %s conversion. The frame type struct zbus_proxy_msg carries a fixed-size channel_name[] array as its last member, and nothing in the transport guarantees the array is NUL-terminated. The only code that verifies termination is zbus_proxy_agent_receive_cb() in subsys/zbus/proxy_agent/zbus_proxy_agent.c, which rejects the frame in precisely those cases — so the warning printed a non-terminated buffer exactly on the error paths where the name had been found invalid (or, for an invalid message_size, had not been inspected at all). Any peer domain able to place a frame of sizeof(struct zbus_proxy_msg) bytes on the bound ipc_service endpoint can trigger it, by sending a frame with an out-of-range message_size or with channel_name[] containing no NUL byte. Reaching the code requires CONFIG_ZBUS_PROXY_AGENT_IPC and logging built at warning level or above (the default), and requires control over the firmware of the peer domain — typically a second core on the same SoC. The resulting strlen() inside the log packager walks past the end of the frame object until it finds a zero byte. With the icmsg backend the frame lives in a stack buffer of the IPC work-queue thread, so bytes of that thread's stack are rendered into the log message; with the rpmsg backends the scan continues through the shared vring memory. Impact is bounded to disclosure of a small amount of adjacent memory into the receiving domain's log sink, plus a possible fatal fault if the scan leaves a mapped region; the log packager's own -ENOSPC bound prevents the overrun from becoming a write. The fix bounds the conversion with %.*s and MIN(msg->channel_name_len, sizeof(msg->channel_name)).

• CWE-125

• https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/fc065f79a568a6c6cc14b89795bd60e5eabd6f02
• https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-48w8-fjhj-r9w8

Published

Oct 11, 2026

Last Modified

Oct 15, 2026

Status

Awaiting Analysis

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